Using Property Rights to Attack Environmental Protection: Second Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law by Sax, Joseph L.
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 14
Issue 1 Fall 1996 Article 1
September 1996
Using Property Rights to Attack Environmental
Protection: Second Annual Lloyd K. Garrison
Lecture on Environmental Law
Joseph L. Sax
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph L. Sax, Using Property Rights to Attack Environmental Protection: Second Annual Lloyd K.
Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law, 14 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1996)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/1
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Volume 14 Fall 1996 Number 1
THE SECOND ANNUAL
LLOYD K. GARRISON LECTURE
ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Conducted at PacetUniversity
School of Law
April 23, 1996
Using Property Rights to Attack
Environmental Protection
JOSEPH L. SAX*
My subject is how a quarter century of development in
environmental protection is jeopardized by rn-conceived legis-
lative proposals that purport to protect property rights.
Those proposals - sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly -
particularly target two important but controversial environ-
mental programs, governance of wetland development under
the Clean Water Act (CWA), 1 and the Endangered Species
Act (ESA).2 Wetlands regulation not only protects some of
* James H. House & Hiram H. Hurd Endowment Professor of Environ-
mental Regulation, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). At the time
the lecture was delivered, Professor Sax was serving as Counselor to Secretary
of the Interior Bruce Babbitt.
1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act [Clean Water Act] (CWA) §§ 101-
607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
2. Endangered Species Act (ESA) §§ 2-18, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
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our most productive biological areas, but also serves to pro-
tect nearby properties from inappropriate filling and develop-
ment that can cause costly flooding. 3 The ESA protects our
biological heritage not only by selecting out species that are
in jeopardy, but even more importantly, by conserving "the
ecosystems upon which [such] species... depend."4 In pur-
suit of that goal, the law is being administered in cooperation
with state and local governments in a special effort to begin
recovery programs before species become threatened in order
to keep them from being put on the critical list and in need of
intensive care.5
Beginning early int 1995, bills were introduced in the
Congress to the effect that any regulation that diminished
the full developmental value of property in order to protect
species could only be implemented if the public paid for that
diminution, even if its extent was very small.6 The bills were
particularly far-reaching because they provided that loss of a
specified value, not to a property as a whole, but to any af-
fected portion of a property must be paid by the public. This
was explained during a debate on the House floor as requir-
ing compensation if development was restricted on even one
acre out of a 100 acre tract, where that one acre was a wet-
land or habitat for a listed species.7 In many, if not most,
cases the bills would have generated claims for compensation
3. See CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
4. ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
5. See, e.g., Ralph K. Haurwitz, Salamander Pulled From Endangered
Consideration; US., State Agreement, AUSTIN AhmRIcAN-STATESAAN, Aug. 29,
1996, at Al; Joan Laatz Jewett, Kitzhaber Drafts Plan To Revive Coho Salmon,
OREGoN AN, Aug. 24, 1996, at A-01.
6. The principal bills in the 104th Congress were H.R. 925 (also H.R. 9),
which passed the House in March, 1995, and S. 605, which was reported out of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, but was not brought before the full Senate,
largely because its proponents lacked sufficient votes to break a threatened fili-
buster. See Chuck McCutcheon et al., Lott Tells Lobbyists Property Rights Bill
Is Dead for This Year, CQ MONITOR, Sept. 9, 1996, at 5.
7. See 141 CONG. REc. H2509 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995)(statement of Rep.
DeFazio). For a useful survey of the provisions of the bills see David Coursen,
Property Rights Legislation: A survey of Federal and State Assessment and
Compensation Measures, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,239 (May, 1996).
The first such bill was H.R. 3875, introduced by Rep. Bill Tauzin of Louisiana in
1994. 140 CONG. REc. H679 (Feb. 23, 1994).
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from the first dollar, or first acre, of loss of development
value, though there is no evidence that wetland regulation
and the ESA diminish values any more than conventional lo-
cal zoning and building codes for which compensation is not
required.
The idea that owners should be compensated for restric-
tions that have any economic impact whatever represents a
radical departure from existing law and precedent, not only
in this country but everywhere in the world, and it would en-
act a view that has been repeatedly and explicitly rejected by
the Supreme Court of the United States over its entire his-
tory.8 It has never been the law that a property owner has a
right to exact every possible economic benefit permitted by
virtually unbridled use and development, whether the subject
is regulation of land or drugs, airplane safety or banks, mine
safety, or setbacks and height limits.
Despite this unbroken history and tradition, proponents
of compensation legislation persist. Their bills are almost
certainly intended to undercut environmental protection,
though of course the text says nothing to that effect. For ex-
ample, the bill that passed the House of Representatives last
year, though its title is general, the "Private Property Protec-
tion Act,"9 in fact, applies only to "specified regulatory laws"
which are defined solely as the ESA and the wetlands pro-
gram of the OWA, and several auxiliary areas that are af-
fected by those laws, such as the federal reclamation
program.' 0
The Senate, in a remarkably candid report issued in
March, 1996, on S.605 (its version of compensation legisla-
tion), explains that the compensation provision "is designed
to address situations . . .such as when the Army Corps of
Engineers forbids an owner from developing.., a wetland
8. Most recently in the unanimous opinion in Concrete Pipe & Prods. of
California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645
(1993).
9. H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995).
10. See id.
1996]
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.... "11 The Report emphasizes that while the bill allows the
government a limited defense to paying compensation in
some instances, "[wietlands and endangered species land use
limitations" will rarely be able to escape the bill's mandate
that the public must pay to obtain compliance with the law.12
The ESA and wetlands programs, according to the Report,
are the laws that most harm property owners and that there-
fore need special controls. 13
The limited defense to which the Report refers is a provi-
sion stating that the requirement that the public pay com-
pensation can be avoided only if the conduct in question is a
"nuisance" according to state law.'4 This standard has never
been the governing rule for takings cases. The Supreme
Court has never taken the position that to avoid compensa-
tion a regulation must constitute a common law nuisance.
The Court made this point clear in the Mugler v. Kansas'5 in
1887, again in Euclid v. Ambler Realty' 6 in 1926, and yet
again in Miller v. Schoene,17 in 1928. It has never departed
from that view.
Plainly, nuisance is an inappropriate standard by which
to measure compensability. Private nuisance is a rather
technical category that involves using one's land so as to in-
terfere with neighboring land uses.'8 In some states, it does
not even cover routine wrongs that do harm to neighboring
land, such as filling a wetland that backs water up onto a
neighbor's land,19 or land subsidence from mining.20 In many
states - such as California - even draining hazardous agricul-
11. The Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995 - S. 605, S. Rep. 104-239, at
24, (1996), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cmtrpt File.
12. Id. at 27.
13. See id. at 21.
14. See H.R. 925, 104th Cong., § 4 (1995).
15. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The conduct in Mugler only became a nuisance by
the statutory enactment which was challenged as a taking. The conduct was
perfectly lawful at the time the defendants purchased their breweries.
16. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
17. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
18. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS
§§ 86-87 (5th ed. 1984).
19. See, e.g., Johnson v. Whitten, 384 A.2d 698 (Me. 1978).
20. See M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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tural wastes onto adjacent lands would not amount to a nui-
sance because commercial agricultural practices are declared
not to be nuisances under state statutory laws known as
"right to farm" legislation.21
Moreover, private nuisance requires a judicial standard
of proof of causation between the defendant's action and the
harm to the plaintiff, a proof that is often very difficult to ad-
duce where large numbers of indistinguishable pollution
sources are involved, as often occurs with common air and
water pollutants. 22 Federal pollution laws - whose purpose is
to limit risk to the public health - often restrict pollution to
levels below that which would be prerequisite to judicial in-
tervention in a suit between two parties.23 Nor does nuisance
law protect persons of greater than normal sensitivity, as do
some federal environmental statutes.24 On the other hand,
public nuisance, which deals with harms to the general pub-
lic, covers a grab-bag of unrelated wrongs that run from
blocking a highway to running a brothel, or - at one time -
bowling on Sunday, a list that induced Dean Prosser to de-
clare nuisance the most impenetrable jungle in the entire
law.2 5
21. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 3482.5 (West Supp. 1996).
No agricultural activity, operation, or facility, or appurtenances
thereof, conducted or maintained for commercial purposes, and in a
manner consistent with proper and accepted customs and stan-
dards, as established and followed by similar agricultural opera-
tions in the same locality, shall be or become a nuisance, private or
public, due to any changed condition in or about the locality, after it
has been in operation for more than three years if it was not a nui-
sance at the time it began.
Id § 3482.5(a)(1). See generally, Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G.
Fischer, Protecting the Right To Farm: Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions
Against The Farmer, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 95, 118 n.108 (1983).
22. See 1 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATisE ON ENvmo'mO TrAL LAW § 1.05, at 1-44
(1996). The various differences noted in this paragraph are discussed in a
memorandum prepared for congressional debate on the compensation bills, and
widely distributed during the 104th Congress. Memorandum on the Nuisance
Exceptions in H.R. 925 and S. 605 (revised, May 25, 1995) (on file with author).
23. See Wi.Lum H. RODGERS, JR., ErmoRmwmrAL LAw § 1.4, at 53 (2d ed.
1994).
24. See KEETON, supra note 18, § 88, at 628-29.
25. See id. § 86, at 616-19.
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5
6 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Why, exactly, the proponents of this legislation selected
nuisance as their single defense is not entirely clear. The
consequence of doing so, however, is unmistakable. A nui-
sance standard operates to restrict regulation to preexisting
covered areas, and to impose judicial standards of proof
designed for private litigation, rather than for public stan-
dards which are often designed to deal with risks to public
health and welfare while proof is still uncertain. A standard
drawn from traditional common law undercuts a central pur-
pose of modern environmental law. Nuisance law is poorly
suited both to cumulative harms and to those matters that
involve sophisticated science, and difficult decisions about
risk-precisely the reason that common law nuisance has
largely given way to statutory regulation across the spectrum
of environmental matters. Indeed, if you go back and ex-
amine the legislative history of modern environmental laws,
you will see statements such as this: "we could not find a
successful vehicle under the common law, under nuisance
law, that would adequately protect these individuals. "26
The idea that whatever was not treated as a nuisance in
the past, whether specifically or generically, cannot be pro-
hibited without violating property rights was rejected by the
Supreme Court back in 1926 when zoning was first chal-
lenged. Justice Sutherland's words, in Euclid,27 are as fresh
today for environmental protection as they were then for the
protection of urban development:
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which,
as applied to existing conditions, are... apparent..., a
century ago, or even a half a century ago, probably would
have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive.... [W]hile
the meaning of the constitutional guaranties never varies,
the scope of their application must expand or contract to
meet the new and different conditions which are constantly
26. Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings Before the Sub-
comms. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Sen. Comm.
on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., pt. 4, 693 (1979).
27. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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coming within the field of their operation. In a changing
world it is impossible that it should be otherwise.28
Another notion that has been advanced by proponents of
compensation legislation is that only matters that deal with
health and safety (and perhaps morals) are legitimate sub-
jects of regulation that need not be compensated. 29 This too
is a notion without historical foundation. The Court has
never imposed any such limitation. The scope of regulation
to which property owners must accommodate includes the
public welfare, under which much environmental legislation
is included. Public welfare laws embrace economic regulation
of all kinds, historic preservation, open space zoning and
height and density limits, and the whole range of fish and
wildlife protection, as well as the ability to protect songbirds
against what Rachel Carson described as a Silent Spring.30
As the Supreme Court has put it on numerous occasions,
"the police power embraces regulations designed to promote
public convenience or the general welfare, and not merely
those in the interest of public health, safety, and morals."3 1
The Court has never drawn distinctions, as to the duty to
compensate, among those different police or regulatory
powers.
Those who urge the enactment of laws that could effec-
tively shut down the ESA seem to believe that protection of
wildlife - of which the ESA is a modern, scientifically directed
version - is somehow new and unprecedented. But this too is
simply wrong.
In 1900, in response to the virtual extermination of its
beaver populations, the New York Legislature enacted a law
28. Id. at 387.
29. H.R. 925 contains a limited health and safety hazard exception. H.R.
925, 104th Cong., § 5(a) (1995). Senator Hank Brown of Colorado at one time
discussed incorporating a similar exception in S. 605, but it was never intro-
duced. A modified version of S. 605, S. 1954, introduced by Senator Orrin
Hatch, contained an exception for civil rights and disability-based discrimina-
tion, § 602.
30. See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
31. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 429
(1935).
1996]
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prohibiting the hunting, molestation, or disturbance of bea-
ver.32 A few years later, the State acquired a number of bea-
ver and began restocking certain Adirondack streams with
them.33 One of those streams, where the new population
flourished, happened to abut a tract of forested land held by a
Mr. Barrett.34 The beaver assiduously felled hundreds of
Barrett's trees.3 5 Since the State had in effect installed the
beaver on his land, Barrett claimed they were agents of the
State.36 He sued for compensation for the damage the beaver
had done.37 The Court rejected his claim, noting that the
public has a right to protect wild animals, and had been doing
so at least going back to the Colonial laws of the 1700s.3 8 The
court said there was no doubt of the validity of the ban on
harming the beaver and went on to say:
Wherever protection is accorded, harm may be done to the
individual. Deer or moose may browse on his crops, mink
or skunks kill his chickens, robins eat his cherries...., and
no one can complain...
The police power is not to be limited to guarding
merely the physical or material interests of the citizen....
The eagle is preserved not for its use, but for its beauty.
The same thing may be said of the beaver.... [Their pres-
ervation] does not unduly oppress individuals ....
... The prohibition against disturbing the beaver is not
different from that assumed by the Legislature when it
prohibits the destruction of the nests and eggs of wild birds
even when the latter are found upon private property.3 9
Similar laws have been sustained throughout our his-
tory. Fifty years after the Barrett case, a similar issue arose
32. See Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1917).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Barrett, 116 N.E. at 100.
38. See id.
39. Id.
[Vol. 14
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in Montana. There, a rancher complained that elk were com-
ing on his land and eating his pasture.40 He was prohibited
from shooting them and the Fish and Game Commission re-
fused his demand that it come out and rid him of the intrud-
ing elk.4 1 The State Supreme Court said:
Montana is one of the few areas in the nation where wild
game abounds. It is regarded as one of the greatest of the
state's natural resources, as well as the chief attraction for
visitors. Wild game existed here long before the coming of
man. One who acquires property in Montana does so with
notice and knowledge of the presence of wild game and pre-
sumably is cognizant of its natural habits. Wild game does
not possess the power to distinguish between [natural food
and crops], and cannot like domestic animals be controlled
through an owner. Accordingly a property owner in this
state must recognize the fact that there may be some in-
jury to property or inconvenience from wild game for which
there is no recourse.42
These are not unique or unusual examples. Similar
cases can be found in many States. I emphasize this tradition
because the Senate Report to which I referred earlier appears
to take the position that owners subject to wetlands and en-
dangered species laws are especially deserving of compensa-
tion because the regulation does not grow out of preexisting
regulatory schemes. Therefore, the authors of the report ap-
parently conclude, owners should not expect to be regulated.
If that is their premise, they may be unaware of the long,
evolving tradition of wildlife protection, as well as the de-
cades-long regulation of wetlands, and the fact that the ESA
itself has been in place now for more than a quarter of a
century.
The statute books abound with laws that call on land-
owners to accommodate to the protection of our wildlife heri-
40. See Montana ex rel. Sackman v. State Fish & Game Comm., 438 P.2d
663, 664 (Mont. 1968).
41. See id.
42. Id. at 666 (quoting State v. Rathbone, 100 P.2d 86, 92-93 (Mont. 1940).
1996]
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tage.43 Among these are the Migratory Bird Conservation
Act" which restricts taking protected animals and the Eagle
Protection Act45 which governs trade in protected birds. In
addition, under the Wild Free Roaming Horses and Burro
Act46 and the Unlawful Inclosures Act,47 courts have rejected
taking-of-property claims by those whose forage is eaten by
wild horses, or by antelope that cannot be fenced out. More
than 100 years ago, in 1894, the Supreme Court allowed a
state to destroy private fishing nets to protect a public fish-
ery, noting that "preservation of game and fish... has always
been treated as within the proper domain of the police power
."48
Proponents of compensation laws say they do not oppose
environmental laws like the ESA. They just say that when
such laws are implemented, the public must pay, and that
the money is to come out of the program agency's existing
budget. 49 I have so far urged that neither the Constitution
nor tradition supports any such requirement. It is also neces-
sary to understand the practical implications of compensa-
tion bills. One doesn't have to follow congressional affairs
very closely to know that there will be no money, or very little
money, to pay compensation claims in this era of efforts to
achieve a balanced budget and deficit reduction. The bills'
proponents know this. Their expectation is that agencies will
simply regulate less, not because the agencies will determine
that less regulation is needed to implement congressional
goals, but because they won't be able to afford to regulate any
more. As the Congressional Budget Office put it in its gen-
tlest bureaucratic language: "CBO expects that enacting [S.
605] would cause federal agencies to attempt to avoid paying
compensation by modifying their decisions, processing per-
43. For many examples see Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endan-
gered Species, and What Does That Say About Whether Restrictions on Private
Property to Protect Them Constitute "Takings"?, 80 IowA L. Rxv. 297 (1995).
44. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 715 - 715s (1994).
45. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 668 - 669j (1994).
46. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331 - 1340 (1994).
47. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061 - 1066 (1994).
48. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 138 (1894).
49. See 141 Cong. Rec. H2509 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995).
[Vol. 14
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mits more quickly, or otherwise changing their behavior."50
More bluntly put, agencies with ESA and wetlands responsi-
bilities would significantly have to dismantle their programs
if compensation bills were enacted.
Of course, if there were a constitutional duty to pay, lack
of money would not be the issue. But as I have noted, there is
no such duty and there never has been. Similarly, if these
programs were costing landowners vast sums of money, there
would be a serious question of fairness to them, but there is
no evidence of that. While the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) has estimated that the cost to the taxpayers of
enacting such laws would be enormous - some $28 billion over
seven years just for the ESA and wetlands programs51 - much
of that would not be costs actually incurred by property own-
ers. The reason is that the bills are drafted so as to inflate
claims. For example:
(1) One need not actually realize a loss. Where possible,
prospective development is affected (though there may
be no plan whatever of development, e.g. farmland that
is likely to stay farmland), that potential loss can be
claimed, and claimed now.
(2) Experience shows that costs of compliance with regula-
tion are almost always much less than projected at the
outset (though values would have to be determined ac-
cording to such projections under these bills). For ex-
ample, when pollution controls for cars were first
proposed in 1970, estimates of compliance costs were
$3,000/car. In fact, actual costs were about one sixth of
that.52 Also, emission reductions and fuel efficiency
gains have fully offset the increased purchase price.53
Acid rain controls are only one fifth of estimates as re-
50. Congressional Budget Cost Estimate [of S. 605], reprinted in S. Rep.
104-239, supra note 10, at 41.
51. See Letter from Alice M. Rivlin, Director of the Office of Management
and Budget, to Senator Orrin Hatch (June 7, 1995).
52. See Gregg Easterbrook, Why Things Are Looking Up, USA WEEKN ,
Apr. 16, 1995, at 4.
53. See id
1996]
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cently as 1990.5 4 These are typical real costs in the
light of experience, and innovativeness by companies.
(3) Compensation bills would create a situation in which
there is no incentive to cooperate or to seek adaptations
or innovations of the sort that make compliance costs
lower than estimated; indeed, they create precisely the
opposite incentive, making it profitable for owners to
sit back and wait for compensation, rather than seek-
ing cost-effective ways to comply.
So far I have focused largely on the legal framework of
compensation laws and their potential to tear down some of
the basic building blocks of our environmental protections.
But legal rights are not the only issue. In recognition of the
potential of these programs - indeed of any regulatory scheme
- to impose undue burdens on some of those affected, the De-
partment of the Interior, at the behest of Secretary Bruce
Babbitt, has put into operation a series of administrative re-
forms designed to assure that implementation of the ESA
does not impose such burdens, especially on small property
owners, for whom compliance is likely to be especially diffi-
cult (other Departments have adopted similar policies tai-
lored to their programs). I will close simply by mentioning
the most important of these programs:
(1) Habitat Conservation Plans are agreed-upon arrange-
ments that permit economic development to go for-
ward, while protecting a species from jeopardy. They
are authorized under the ESA.55 Secretary Babbitt
has initiated a "no surprises" policy so that owners who
agree to a plan will not later be called on to contribute
additional land or money.56 This policy has en-
couraged many landowners to participate in such
54. See Mathew L. Wald, Acid Rain Pollution Credits Are Not Enticing Util-
ities, N.Y. T~mms, June 5, 1995, at All.
55. See ESA § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a).
56. See U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Administrator's New Assurance Policy
Tells Landowners: "No Surprises" in Endangered Species Planning (News Re-
lease), Aug. 11, 1994, available in WESTLAW, FENV-NR Database, 1994 WL440313 (D.O.I.).
[Vol. 14
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plans, showing that the ESA can be made to work with-
out undue economic burdens on landowners.
(2) The ESA authorizes so-called 4(d) rules as to
threatened species, which allow some take of individ-
ual listed species so long as adequate protection is pro-
vided for the survival and recovery of the species as a
whole.57 For example, in the habitat area of the Spot-
ted Owl in the Pacific Northwest, a 4(d) rule was em-
ployed to free up tracts of as much as 80 acres so that
small forest products companies were not blocked from
maintaining harvest plans.58
(3) The Department seeks to alleviate burdens on owners
by contributing public resources (highway mitigation
money, lands from closed military bases, unallocated
water from federal dams to produce instream flows)
where the burdens of compliance can be severe for pri-
vate parties.
(4) The Secretary has adopted a presumptive exemption
for homeowners and small landowners whose activities
only cause small impacts, up to 5 acres.59
(5) The Fish and Wildlife Service issued a policy directive
on July 1, 1994, that requires it to identify, to the ex-
tent known at the time of a final listing of a species,
specific activities that are exempt from or that will not
be affected by the prohibitions of the ESA regarding
take of listed species. The purpose of the policy is to
give direction and notice to landowners, and to indicate
activities that are not ordinarily affected by the Act,
such as existing agricultural practices.
(6) The Secretary has adopted a "Safe Harbor" program,
which provides that owners will not be disadvantaged
if they manage their land in a way that makes it more
attractive in the future as habitat. Owners will be able
57. See ESA § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
58. The plan is explained in a Department of the Interior News Release.
See U.S. Dep't of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Fish and Wildlife
Service Proposes Special Easing Regulatory Burden on Timber Harvest on Non-
Federal Lands (News Release), Feb. 7, 1995, available in WESTLAW, FENV-
NR Database, 1994 WL 53206 (D.O.I.).
59. A proposed rule was issued on July 20, 1995. See Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Rule Exempting Certain Small Land-
owners and Low-Impact Activities From Endangered Species Act Requirements
for Threatened Species, 60 Fed. Reg. 37419 (1995).
1996]
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to manage their land as they wish, and will be allowed
to reduce new habitat back to an original baseline if
they wish, without being responsible for destroying ad-
ditional habitat they have voluntarily created. Safe
Harbor provisions, where applicable, can be included in
habitat conservation plans.
Each of these administrative innovations demonstrates
that the ESA and similar basic environmental values can be
protected vigorously while at the same time protecting eco-
nomic values for both private landowners and commodity
users of the public lands. They are elements of an effort to
show that the ESA can be administered so it functions effec-
tively and fairly, and need not be undermined by ill-con-
ceived, grossly expensive, and unnecessary compensation
schemes. Direct attacks on the environment can be easily
seen for what they are. Indirect attacks, as in compensation
bills, are more difficult to parry. Their workings and their
potential impacts are largely hidden from public view. But
they are as threatening as direct assaults on environmental
protection. Fortunately, the compensation bills advanced in
the 104th Congress, in 1995 and 1996, were turned back.
That is the fate they richly deserved.
[Vol. 14
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